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A NATURAL MODEL OF THE MULTIVERSE AXIOMS
VICTORIA GITMAN AND JOEL DAVID HAMKINS
Abstract. If ZFC is consistent, then the collection of countable computably
saturated models of ZFC satisfies all of the Multiverse Axioms of [Hama].
1. Introduction
The multiverse axioms that are the focus of this article arose in connection with
a continuing debate in the philosophy of set theory between the Universe view,
which holds that there is a unique absolute set-theoretical universe, serving as set-
theoretic background for all mathematical activity, and the Multiverse view, which
holds that there are many set-theoretical worlds, each instantiating its own concept
of set. We refer the reader to [Hama] and to several other articles in the same special
issue of the Review of Symbolic Logic for a fuller discussion of this philosophical
exchange (see also [Hamb, Ham09]). The multiverse axioms express a certain degree
of richness for the set-theoretic multiverse, flowing from a perspective that denies
an absolute set-theoretic background.
Meanwhile, the multiverse axioms admit a purely mathematical, non-philosophical
treatment, on which we shall focus here. We shall internalize the study of multi-
verses to set theory by treating them as mathematical objects within ZFC, allowing
for a mathematized simulacrum inside V of the full philosophical multiverse (which
would otherwise include universes outside V ). Specifically, in this article we define
that a multiverse is simply a nonempty set or class of models of ZFC set theory.
The multiverse axioms then correspond to the features listed in Definition 1, which
such a collection may or may not exhibit.
Definition 1 (Multiverse Axioms). Suppose that M is a multiverse, a nonempty
collection of models of ZFC.
(1) The Realizability axiom holds forM if wheneverM is a universe inM and
N is a definable class ofM satisfying ZFC from the perspective ofM , then
N is in M.
(2) The Forcing Extension axiom holds for M if whenever M is a universe in
M and P is a forcing notion in M , then M has a forcing extension of M
by P, a model of the form M [G], where G is an M -generic filter for P.
(3) The Class Forcing Extension axiom holds forM if wheneverM is a universe
in M and P is a ZFC-preserving class forcing notion in M , then M has
a forcing extension of M by P, a model of the form M [G], where G is an
M -generic filter for P.
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(4) The Countability axiom holds for M if for every universe M in M there is
another universe N in M, such that M is a countable set in N .
(5) The Wellfoundedness Mirage axiom holds forM if for every universeM in
M, there is N in M, which thinks M is a set with an ill-founded ω.
Although the next axioms do not appear in [Hama], we shall nevertheless consider
them here. They follow a suggestion of Jonas Reitz, who proposed that whenever
a universe M in the multiverse has a measurable cardinal, then it should be the
internal ultrapower of another universe V , sending its critical point to that cardinal.
That is, the suggestion is that we should be able to iterate large cardinal embeddings
backwards. Here, we generalize the idea to other ultrapowers and to embeddings
generally.
(6) The Reverse Ultrapower Axiom holds forM if for every universe M in M,
there is a universe N inM such that M is the internal ultrapower of N by
an ultrafilter on ω in N .
(7) The Strong Reverse Ultrapower Axiom holds forM if for every universeM1
in M and every ultrafilter U1 in M1 on a set X1 in M1, there is M0 in M,
with an ultrafilter U0 on a set X0, such that M1 is the internal ultrapower
of M0 by U0, sending U0 to U1.
(8) The Reverse Embedding Axiom holds forM, if for every universeM1 inM
and every embedding j1 : M1 → M2 definable in M1 from parameters and
thought by M1 to be elementary, there is M0 in M and similarly definable
j0 :M0 →M1 in M0, such that j1 is the iterate of j0, meaning j1 = j0(j0).
In other words, the Reverse Embedding axiom asserts that every internal ele-
mentary embedding j1 : M1 → M2 arises as an iterate of an earlier embedding.
The idea is that if we are living in M1 and see the embedding j1, then for all we
know, it has already been iterated an enormous number of times. To be precise,
by j1 = j0(j0), we mean that if j0 is definable by ϕ(x, y, a) over M0, then j1 is
definable by ϕ(x, y, j0(a)) over M1.
There is, of course, a certain degree of redundancy in the axioms; for example,
the Class Forcing Extension axiom implies the Forcing Extension axiom, the Re-
verse Embedding axiom implies the Reverse Ultrapower axioms, and the Reverse
Utrapower and Countability axioms imply the Wellfoundedness Mirage. There are
also a few subtler points. In several of the axioms, when it is stated that one model
M is an element of another model N, what is meant is that there is an object in N
that N thinks is a pair 〈m,E〉 for which E is a binary relation on m, and externally,
the set { a ∈ N | N |= a ∈ m } with the relation { (a, b) | N |= aEb } is isomorphic
to M with its relation. Another subtle issue is that in the Countability axiom,
although M must be a countable set in N , there is no insistence that N regard
M as a model of ZFC; indeed, since N itself may be nonstandard, it may have a
nonstandard version of ZFC, with nonstandard size axioms thatM does not satisfy
in N , even if M satisfies ZFC externally. Similarly, the Wellfoundedness Mirage
axiom requires that M is seen to be ill-founded by N , but again N may not look
upon M as a model of ZFC, since N may itself have nonstandard size axioms, and
there is no reason to expect that N believes M to satisfy them. The Realizability
axiom, on the other hand, only applies to the definable models of the universe that
satisfy its own version of ZFC. For example, if M is a model of ZFC with nonstan-
dard ω, then for every natural number n in M , there will be VMα that M believes
to model the Σn theory of its ZFC, and when n is nonstandard, this includes all of
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the standard ZFC; so although these VMα are models of full ZFC, the Realizability
axiom does not apply to them.
Hamkins [Hama] provided a model of the first five multiverse axioms constructed
via iterated ultrapowers, and he inquired at that time whether the collection of
all countable nonstandard models of set theory might already be a model of the
multiverse axioms. Observation 3 and Theorem 11 below show that this is too much,
since the axioms impose a requirement of computable saturation on the models.
Nevertheless, in this article we prove that this is the only such obstacle, for our
main theorem shows that if ZFC is consistent, then the collection of all countable
computably saturated models of ZFC satisfies all of the multiverse axioms.
Main Theorem 2. If ZFC is consistent, then the collection of all countable com-
putably saturated models of ZFC satisfies all the multiverse axioms.
We note that the main theorem will imply that it is not true that every multiverse
satisfying the axioms must consist of countable models. For example, if N is a
nonstandard model of ZFC+Con(ZFC), then we may letM be the models that N
thinks are countable computably saturated models of ZFC. By the main theorem,
N thinks that this collection satisfies all the multiverse axioms, and it follows that
this will really be the case also outside of N . But the models inM will be at least
as large as ωN , which could be as large in cardinality as we like.
2. Computably Saturated Models of Set Theory
In this section, we shall explain precisely why we must restrict to the computably
saturated models and review the key properties of these models that are needed for
the proof of the main theorem. Computable saturation was introduced in [BS76a]
and is also commonly known as recursive saturation. A model M of a computable
language L is said to be computably saturated, if for every finite tuple a¯ inM , every
finitely realizable computable type p(a¯, x¯) is already realized in M . A type p(y¯, x¯)
in a computable language L is computable when the set of the Go¨del codes of its
formulas is a computable set in the usual sense of Turing computability. In the
future, we shall freely associate types with subsets of N consisting of the Go¨del
codes of their formulas. A model of ZFC set theory is ω-nonstandard if it has a
nonstandard ω. Because tuples can be viewed as a single set in models of ZFC, for
these it suffices to consider only computable types of the form p(a, x). Note that a
computably saturated model of ZFC must necessarily be ω-nonstandard since the
type p(x) = {n < x | n ∈ ω}∪{x < ω}, where n is the term 1+ · · ·+1 with n many
1s, is a finitely realizable computable type over any model of ZFC. For any model
M of ZFC, we may consider the trace on the natural numbers of the sets that exist
in M . Specifically, we say that a set A ⊆ N is coded by a in M , if a is a set in M
whose intersection with the standard natural numbers is exactly A. When a is a set
of natural numbers in M , then A is also known as the standard part of a, and the
collection of all sets A arising this way is accordingly called the Standard System
ofM , denoted SSy(M). Note that the standard system of any model must include
all computable sets, since the model will agree on the behavior of any computation
that halts in the standard N. Standard systems have been extensively studied in
the context of models of Peano Arithmetic where they play a crucial conceptual
role, but the notion was originally introduced for models of various set theories
[Fri73].
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Observation 3. Any multiverse satisfying the Wellfoundedness Mirage axiom must
consist entirely of computably saturated models of ZFC.
Proof. IfM satisfies the Wellfoundedness Mirage axiom, it follows that every mem-
ber ofM has a nonstandard ω. Thus, again by the Wellfoundedness Mirage axiom,
every member of M is a set in a model of ZFC having a nonstandard ω. Thus,
every member of M is computably saturated by Lemma 4. 
Lemma 4. Every model of ZFC that is an element of an ω-nonstandard model of
ZFC is computably saturated.
Proof. Suppose that M is a model of ZFC that is an element of an ω-nonstandard
model N of ZFC. In order to see that M is computably saturated, suppose that
p(b, x) is a computable finitely realizable type overM . Let a ∈ N code p(y, x). Since
p(b, x) is finitely realizable and N has a truth predicate for M , for every n ∈ N, the
model N knows that there is c ∈M such thatM |= ϕ(b, c) for every formula ϕ(y, x)
with Go¨del code less than n in a. Because the standard N is not definable in N ,
there must be a nonstandard natural number d ∈ N and an element e ∈M with N
satisfying that M |= ϕ(b, e) for every (possibly nonstandard) formula ϕ(y, x) with
Go¨del code less than d in a. Since d is nonstandard, this includes every formula in
p(y, x). By the absoluteness of satisfaction for standard formulas, it follows that
M |= ϕ(b, e) for every ϕ(b, x) in p(b, x) and thus e realizes p(b, x). 
Lemma 5. If ZFC is consistent, then there are 2ℵ0 many pairwise non-isomorphic
countable computably saturated models of ZFC. Every real is in the standard system
of such a model.
Proof. If ZFC consistent, then every completion of ZFC as a theory has a countable
computably saturated model, because any countable model of ZFC can be extended
elementarily to a computably saturated model by successively realizing types in a
countable elementary chain. For any real x, one can ensure that the type expressing
that x is coded is realized. 
A model M of ZFC is said to be SSy(M)-saturated if it realizes every finitely
realizable type coded in M . It turns out that a model M is computably saturated
if and only if it is SSy(M)-saturated. To see this, fix a type p(y, x) coded by
a ∈ M and fix b ∈ M such that p(b, x) is finitely realizable. Define a new type
q(b, a, x) to consist of all formulas of the form (pϕ(y, x)q ∈ a)→ ϕ(b, x), and observe
that q(y, z, x) is computable and finitely realizable, using the objects realizing the
corresponding fragment of p(b, x). Thus, there is some e inM realizing q(b, a, e), and
it follows that e realizes p(b, e), as desired. We note also that the type of any element
in a computably saturated model is in the standard system of that model: for
a ∈M , define p(a, x) to be the type consisting of all formulas of the form pϕ(y)q ∈
x ↔ ϕ(a) and observe that it is computable and finitely realizable; thus, the type
of a is coded in M . In particular, the theory of any computably saturated model
is an element of its standard system. According to [Kay91], SSy(M)-saturation
was introduced by Wilmers in his unpublished 1975 thesis where he established the
above equivalence.
The next lemma generalizes another fundamental result from models of PA that
appears in [Smo81a] but has as well been attributed to Jensen and Ehrenfeucht
[JE76], and Wilmers, among others.
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Key Lemma 6. Any two countable computably saturated models of ZFC with the
same theory and the same standard system are isomorphic.
Proof. This is a standard model-theoretic back-and-forth construction. The obser-
vations above ensure that the models are standard system-saturated, and all types
of their elements are coded in the standard system. Thus, we may construct the
desired isomorphism in a countable recursive procedure that maps elements of one
model to elements in the other realizing the same types over what has been defined
so far. 
The following lemma will be critical for our verification of the Wellfoundedness
Mirage axiom in the Main Theorem. This fact may have been known some time
ago. For example, Schlipf [Sch77, III.2.6] proved that every computably saturated
model of ZF is an element of an ω-nonstandard model of ZF, and Ressayre [RW87,
3.3] proved that every model of ZF is elementarily equivalent to a model of ZF
containing as an element an isomorphic copy of itself. (See [Hal] for an interesting
discussion.)
Lemma 7. Every countable computably saturated model of ZFC contains an iso-
morphic copy of itself as an element, which it thinks is ω-nonstandard. That is,
if M is a countable computably saturated model of ZFC, then M has an element
N which it thinks is a countable ω-nonstandard model of a fragment of set theory,
such that M ∼= N .
Proof. Suppose that M is a countable computably saturated model of ZFC. As
we noted above, Th(M) is coded by some a ∈ M . By the Reflection Theorem,
every finite subset of this theory is true in some rank initial segment of M , and M
recognizes this for any particular such finite subset. Since the standard cut N is
not definable inM , there must be a nonstandard natural number b inM , such that
M thinks the theory consisting of all formulas whose Go¨del codes are in a and less
than b is consistent. Since b is nonstandard, this includes the entire Th(M). By the
Completeness Theorem in M , therefore, we may build a model N in M satisfying
this consistent fragment of a, which includes all of Th(M), such that additionally,
M thinks N is ω-nonstandard. Since ωM is an initial segment of ωN and M is
ω-nonstandard, it follows that M and N have the same standard system. Also,
since M is ω-nonstandard, it follows by Lemma 4 that N is computably saturated.
We conclude by Lemma 6 that actually M ∼= N . 
By considering the situation from the perspective of the smaller copy of the
model, we deduce:
Corollary 8. Every countable computably saturated model of ZFC is an element of
another countable computably saturated model of ZFC that thinks it is a countable
ω-nonstandard model of a (nonstandard) fragment of set theory.
Note in Lemma 7 that although we know on the outside that N |= ZFC, since
it satisfies Th(M), it could happen that M 6|=“N |= ZFC,” since perhaps M thinks
that some of the nonstandard ZFC axioms of M fail in N . Despite this, Corollary
8 suffices to verify the Countability and Well-foundedness Mirage axioms for the
collection of countable computably saturated models of ZFC, since as we mentioned
there was no insistence in the axioms that the larger model look upon the smaller
as a model of what it thinks is full ZFC. Nevertheless, under a stronger assumption
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it is possible to obtain the stronger conclusion. Surely a stronger assumption is
required, since if N |= ZFC+“M |= ZFC”, then N |= ZFC + Con(ZFC), and so
Con(ZFC+Con(ZFC)). And if this N is an element of a further such model, then
we get Con(Con(Con(ZFC))), and so on transfinitely. The stronger assumption we
shall make is that for every countable computably saturated model M of ZFC, the
theory TM = ZFC+ {Con(ZFC + Γ) | Γ ⊆Fin Th(M)} is consistent.
Theorem 9. If M is a computably saturated countable model of ZFC, then there
is a countable computably saturated model N of ZFC containing M as an element
and satisfying that M is a nonstandard model of ZFC if and only if the theory TM
is consistent.
Proof. The forward implication is immediate, since any such model N will satisfy
the theory TM . For the converse implication, suppose that TM is consistent. By
Lemma 6, it suffices to show that there exists N containing a countable computably
saturated model K with the same theory and standard system as M that it recog-
nizes as a model of ZFC. It will immediately follow that SSy(N) = SSy(K) and
so we shall need to ensure that SSy(N) = SSy(M). Scott observed in [Sco62] that
every standard system is a Scott set, that is, a Boolean algebra of subsets of natural
numbers that is closed under relative computability and contain at least one branch
through every element that is a binary tree. In that paper, he famously showed that
given a countable Scott set X and a theory T ∈ X extending PA, there is a model
of T whose standard system is exactly X. Wilmers in his thesis, showed that this
easily generalizes to obtaining a computably saturated model. Let X = SSy(M)
and observe that TM ∈ X, since TM is computable in Th(M), which is an element
of X. Summarizing, we can build a countable computably saturated model N of
ZFC satisfying TM and having same standard system as M . Since N satisfies TM ,
it satisfies Con(ZFC+Γ) where Γ is a nonstandard segment containing Th(M). So
N can build a countable model K that it thinks satisfies ZFC + Γ. 
We have observed that the assumption that TM is consistent transcends Con(ZFC).
But the assumption is not so strong, for if M is an element of an ω-model N of
ZFC, then N satisfies TM . In particular, if there is a transitive model N of ZFC,
then it satisfies TM , and hence also Con(TM ), for every countable model M in N .
Let us close this section by mentioning the concept of resplendency, a powerful
generalization of computable saturation that has unified many applications of it.
Resplendency is a second-order analogue of computable saturation, in that it con-
cerns realizing second-order types; that is, it is about interpreting a new predicate
symbol on the universe. Specifically, a first order structure M is resplendent, if
every finitely-realized computable type p(X,~a) in the language of M expanded by
a predicate symbol X with ~a a finite list of parameters fromM is realized in 〈M,X〉
for some interpretation of X . (The type is finitely realized if all finite subsets of
p are realized in such a model 〈M,X〉.) The concept of resplendency was intro-
duced by Barwise and Schlipfe [BS76b], and independently by Ressayre [Res86],
who proved that every countable computably saturated model is resplendent (see
also [Smo81b]). Schlipfe [Sch80] proved that a countable model of set theory is
computably saturated if and only if it is ω-nonstandard and there is a club of or-
dinals α with Vα ≺ V . Moschovakis and Chang (see [CK90]) proved that every
saturated model is resplendent. Although we have presented our arguments in an
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elementary manner appealing only to computable saturation, it appears that many
of our lemmas can be fruitfully generalized, by proving them via resplendency.
3. Proof of Main Theorem
Let us now complete the proof of the main theorem, which we restate here for
convenience.
Main Theorem. If ZFC is consistent, then the collection of all countable com-
putably saturated models of ZFC satisfies all the multiverse axioms.
Proof. We shall argue in turn that the collection M of all countable computably
saturated models of ZFC satisfies each of the multiverse axioms. First, since we
have assumed that ZFC is consistent, Lemma 5 shows that in fact there are many
countable computably saturated models of ZFC. So M is nonempty.
Consider now the Realizability axiom. Suppose thatM ∈ M andN is a definable
class in M and a model of ZFC. Since M is an element of some other nonstandard
model M ′ by Corollary 8, it follows that N is also an element of M ′, and so
by Lemma 4, it follows that N is computably saturated. Since N is clearly also
countable, as M was countable, it follows that N ∈ M. Thus, M satisfies the
Realizability axiom.
For the Forcing axioms, suppose that M ∈ M and P is a forcing notion in
M . Certainly we can easily produce by diagonalization an M -generic filter G ⊆ P
and form the forcing extension M [G]. Furthermore by Corollary 8, we can do so
inside any model M ′ which looks upon M ′ as countable. Thus, there is a forcing
extension M [G] inside such an M ′. It now follows by Lemma 4 that M [G] is
computably saturated, as desired. So M satisfies the Forcing and Class Forcing
Extension axioms.
The difficult cases of the Wellfoundedness Mirage and Countability axioms are
exactly provided for by Corollary 8.
The Reverse Ultrapower axioms follow from the Reverse Embedding axiom, so
it suffices to consider that axiom. Suppose that M1 is countable and computably
saturated and j1 :M1 →M2 is an elementary embedding inM1, defined inM1 from
some parameter z, so that j1(x) = y ⇐⇒ M1 |= ϕ(x, y, z). By interpreting this
definition in M2 using j1(z) we obtain the iterate embedding j2 = j1(j1) : M2 →
M3, defined by j2(x) = y ⇐⇒ M2 |= ϕ(x, y, j1(z)). Since the critical point of j1
must be at least ωM1 , which is nonstandard, it follows that M1 and M2 share a
nonstandard initial segment of their natural numbers and therefore have the same
standard system. Since they also have the same theory, it follows by Lemma 6
that there is an isomorphism π : M1 ∼= M2. Since the type of z in M1 is the same
as the type of j1(z) in M2, we may assume in the back-and-forth argument that
π(z) = j1(z). Thus, since j1 is defined in M1 by ϕ(x, y, z), the map π carries j1 to
the class defined in M2 by ϕ(x, y, π(z)), which is j2. In other words, π carries the
entire map j1 : M1 → M2 isomorphically to the map j2 : M2 → M3. And since
j2 = j1(j1) is by definition an iterate of j1, the Reverse Embedding axiom holds in
the case of j2 :M2 →M3. Since this is isomorphic via π to j1 :M1 →M2, it follows
by replacing the objects with their image under π that there is j0 :M0 →M1 such
that j1 = j0(j0), as desired. 
Recall that a model M is said to be κ-saturated for a cardinal κ if every finitely
realizable type in the language extended to include some < κ-many constants for
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elements of the model is already realized. A model of cardinality κ is said to
be simply saturated if it is κ-saturated. It is a basic fact that any two saturated
models of the same theory and same cardinality are isomorphic. IfM is a saturated
model of ZFC and N is a model of ZFC that is an element of M , then N must
be saturated and have the same cardinality as M . The cardinality is the same
since ωM , by saturation, is already of the same cardinality as M . For details on
saturated models, see [CK90]. Thus, it easily follows that every saturated model of
ZFC of cardinality κ has an isomorphic copy of itself that it thinks is a countable ω-
nonstandard model of a finite fragment of ZFC. Other facts necessary for the proof
of the Main Theorem follow for saturated models of ZFC of cardinality κ as well; in
most cases they are easier to see than for computable saturation because any two
elementarily equivalent saturated models of the same cardinality are isomorphic.
Thus, we get the following corollary of the Main Theorem.
Corollary 10. If there are saturated models of ZFC of cardinality κ, then the
collection of these satisfies all the multiverse axioms.
It is natural to wonder whether the collection of all models of ZFC forms a model
of the multiverse axioms, or whether the collection of all countable models of ZFC
does so. Unfortunately, neither does.
Theorem 11. If ZFC is consistent, then the collection of all models of ZFC is not
a model of the multiverse axioms. Neither is the collection of all countable models
of ZFC, nor the collection of all countable nonstandard models of ZFC, nor the
collection of countable ω-nonstandard models of ZFC, nor the collection of such
models restricted to a given consistent completion of ZFC.
Proof. By Observation 3, all we need to do for the first part is to show that there
is a model of ZFC that is not computably saturated. In fact, every consistent
completion of ZFC has a countable ω-nonstandard model that is not computably
saturated (and this proves the subsequent claims). To see this, take any countable
nonstandard model M of ZFC. The definable cut of M consists of all x ∈ M such
that x ∈ (Vα)
M , where α is a definable ordinal in M (without parameters). If
M0 is the definable cut of M , then it is relatively easy to verify the Tarski-Vaught
criterion, and so M0 ≺ M . It follows that M0 has exactly the same definable
ordinals asM , and these are unbounded in the ordinals ofM0. Thus,M0 omits the
type p(x) asserting that whenever there is a unique ordinal satisfying ϕ(y), then
y < x. This is a computable finitely realizable type not realized in M0, and so M0
is not computably saturated. Thus, by Observation 3, it can not be in any model
of the multiverse axioms. 
Let us conclude this paper by considering the degree to which we might expect a
multiverse to be upward directed. Specifically, a multiverseM is upward directed, if
for any two elementsM,N ∈ M there is an elementW ∈ M containing (isomorphic
copies of) M and N as elements. The multiverseM is countably upward directed if
for any countable subcollection M0 ⊆ M, there is an element W ∈ M containing
(an isomorphic copy of) every element of M0. It is easy to see that the multiverse
of all countable computably saturated models of ZFC is not upward directed. This
is because any two elements of an upward directed multiverse M containing only
ω-nonstandard models must have the same standard system. Suppose that M and
N are elements of an upward directed multiverseM containing only ω-nonstandard
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models. By directedness, there is W ∈ M with M and N both in W . Since the
ωW is an initial segment of ωM and ωN , and is itself nonstandard, it follows that
all three models M , N and W have the same standard system. Thus, all models in
M have the same standard system. Since any real can be placed into the standard
system of a countable computably saturated model of ZFC, it follows that not all
countable computably saturated models of ZFC have the same standard system.
So this multiverse is not upward directed. Nevertheless, this is the only obstacle.
Theorem 12. If ZFC is consistent, the multiverse of countable computably sat-
urated models having a fixed standard system is countably upward directed, and
continues to satisfy all the multiverse axioms.
Proof. Fix a given Scott set S and consider the multiverse MS of all countable
computably saturated models of ZFC having standard system S. We observe first
that the proof of the main theorem goes through for MS , since in each part of
that argument, the desired universe had the same standard system as the original
model. So it remains only to argue thatMS is countably upward directed. Suppose
that M0 = {M0,M1, . . . } is a countable subcollection of MS , so that every Mn
is a countable computably saturated model of ZFC with standard system S. By
the remarks before Lemma 6, it follows that Th(Mn) is in S for every n. Let M
be any ω-nonstandard model having standard system S. Since Th(Mn) is coded in
M , by arguments of the proof of Lemma 7, M can build a model mn satisfying the
theory Th(Mn) and having SSy(mn) = S. Therefore, by Lemma 6, it follows that
mn and Mn are isomorphic. In summary, we have proved that every model in MS
serves as a witness to the countable upward directedness of MS. 
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